Seth Rich

Exploration of Conspiracy Theories from Perspective of Esoteric Traditions

Moderator: yorick

Re: Seth Rich

Postby kinderdigi » Sat Jan 06, 2018 9:22 pm


Jason C. Pittman, LCDR, USN Bachelor’s of Music, University of Texas, Austin, Texas 1998 Master’s of Education, Troy State University, Troy, Alabama, 2004 ... zVBBwJoLM6

Craven was a very bright man and a pioneer .. kd

The Silent War: The Cold War Battle Beneath the Sea Paperback – April 2, 2002
by John Pina Craven (Author) ... 0743223268

From Wired:
"Craven may sound like a brilliant psychotic, but he's got plenty of credentials: a PhD in ocean engineering, a law degree, and a stint as chief scientist for the US Navy's Special Projects Office. There he was instrumental in developing the Polaris missile program, the submarine-based backbone of America's nuclear deterrence and one of the most complex defense systems ever. In fact, most deep-ocean activities – saturation diving, exploring with submersibles, searching for tiny objects on the ocean floor – owe their origins to top secret, cold war-era Navy projects in which Craven had a hand" ... topic_set=

John Craven, naval scientist - obituary

Under-water specialist who used new techniques to locate a hydrogen bomb and a missing submarine ... tuary.html
BFCus Regularus
Posts: 559
Joined: Fri Feb 24, 2017 12:50 am

Re: Seth Rich

Postby kinderdigi » Sun Jan 07, 2018 4:50 pm

Russia Launches New Nuclear-Powered Carrier Killer Sub

A new multipurpose nuclear-powered submarine was launched at the Sevmash shipyards on March 31.

By Franz-Stefan Gady for The DiplomatApril 04, 2017

The Diplomat

The Russian Navy has launched its first Project 885-M Yasen M-class multipurpose attack nuclear-powered submarine (SSN), christened Kazan, at the Sevmash shipyards in Severodvinsk, a port city on Russia’s White Sea in Arkhangelsk Oblast, on March 31.

Under construction at the Sevmash shipyards since 2009, the Kazan is the second Yasen-class SSN launched by the Russian Navy and the first upgraded Yasen M-class boat fitted with improved sensors and weapons systems.

The new boat is reportedly equipped with eight vertical silos for submarine-launched cruise missiles and ten torpedo tubes. The improved Yasen M-class submarine is expected to be quieter than the original Yasen-class SSN and has been built with low magnetic steel to reduce its magnetic signature.
Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month.
However, while the improved Yasen M-class appears to be the quietest nuclear-powered submarine ever to enter service with the Russian Navy, the class is purportedly not equal to the United States Navy’s new Virginia-class attack subs, and is more on par with older Seawolf-class boats, built by the U.S. Navy from 1989 to 2005.

Judging from publicly available sources, the Yasen M-class is a formidable weapons platform armed, among other things, with the 3M-54 Kalibr supersonic cruise missile available in land-attack, anti-ship, and anti-submarine variants, and a new deep-water torpedo, an improved variant of the 533-milimeter Fizik-1 homing torpedo (See: “Russia’s Deadliest Subs to Receive New Heat-Seeking Torpedos”).

Despite the recent launch of the Kazan and the official goal of building seven improved Yasen M-class boats by 2023, it is unlikely that Russia’s shipbuilding industry “will complete more than two additional Yasen M-class boats by 2020 due to budgetary constraints — the subs are among the most expensive pieces of military hardware ever built by Russia,” I reported earlier in the year. As I noted elsewhere:

The 13,800-ton, 390-foot long and highly automated Yasen-classof Russian attack submarines was supposed to replace older Soviet-era multi-purpose nuclear submarine models by 2020.

Yet, the exorbitant costs of the submarines — estimated to be twice as much as the new Borei-class SSBNs – has so far led only to the commissioning of one out of eight SSNs (…).

In addition, I explained in January:

One of the reasons for the excessive costs is untried new technology installed aboard the Yasen M-class. For example, Yasen M boats are allegedly equipped with a new spherical sonar, dubbed MGK-600 Irtysh-Amfora, and a new fourth-generation nuclear reactor, which reportedly provides a maximum underwater speed of 35 knots and a surface speed of 20 knots.

Nevertheless, the boat’s purported stealthiness, in combination with its deep diving capabilities, will most likely constitute a genuine threat to Western subs and U.S. carrier strike groups.

“The launch of an advanced multi-role submarine of the improved project Yasen M is quite an event for the whole of the country, its armed forces, and its Navy,” the Russian Navy commander-in-chief, Admiral Vladimir Korolyov, said during the March 31 launch ceremony, according to TASS news agency. “We are working together on a plan approved by the government. We are in the process of creating a submarine group capable of coping with missions around the world and maintaining Russia’s security.”

Only one Yasen-class attack submarine, the K-329 Severodvinsk, has so far been commissioned into the Russian Navy. Laid down in 1993, the Severodvinsk has been undergoing sea trials since 2011 and it is unclear whether the boat is operational or not. There are currently five more Yasen M-class subs under construction at the Sevmash Shipyard. The Kazan is expected to be handed over to the Russian Navy’s Northern Fleet in 2018.

© 2018 The Diplomat. All Rights Reserved. ... iller-sub/
BFCus Regularus
Posts: 559
Joined: Fri Feb 24, 2017 12:50 am

Re: Seth Rich

Postby kinderdigi » Sun Jan 07, 2018 4:55 pm

Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV)

The Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) is developing an unmanned vessel optimized to robustly track quiet diesel electric submarines. The program is structured around three primary goals:
•Explore the performance potential of a surface platform conceived from concept to field demonstration under the premise that a human is never intended to step aboard at any point in its operating cycle. As a result, a new design paradigm emerges with reduced constraints on conventional naval architecture elements such as layout, accessibility, crew support systems, and reserve buoyancy. The objective is to generate a vessel design that exceeds state-of-the art platform performance to provide propulsive overmatch against diesel electric submarines at a fraction of their size and cost.
•Advance unmanned maritime system autonomy to enable independently deploying systems capable of missions spanning thousands of kilometers of range and months of endurance under a sparse remote supervisory control model. This includes autonomous compliance with maritime laws and conventions for safe navigation, autonomous system management for operational reliability, and autonomous interactions with an intelligent adversary.
•Demonstrate the capability of the ACTUV system to use its unique characteristics to employ non-conventional sensor technologies that achieve robust continuous track of the quietest submarine targets over their entire operating envelope.

While the ACTUV program is focused on demonstrating the ASW tracking capability in this configuration, the core platform and autonomy technologies are broadly extendable to underpin a wide range of missions and configurations for future unmanned naval vessels. ... ned-vessel

The Sea Hunter is an autonomous unmanned surface vehicle (USV) launched in 2016 as part of the DARPA Anti-Submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) program.[1] It was christened 7 April 2016 in Portland, Oregon. It was built by Vigor Industrial.[2] The vessel continues the line of experimental "Sea" ships, including the Sea Shadow, Sea Fighter, and Sea Slice.[3] The Sea Hunter is classified as a Class III USV and designated the Medium Displacement Unmanned Surface Vehicle (MDUSV).[4]

DARPA's Self-Driving Submarine Hunter Steers Like a Human

By Rachel CourtlandPosted 7 Apr 2016 | 18:05 GMT

IEEE Spectrum: Technology, Engineering, and Science News | Jan 2018

Today is christening day for DARPA’s Sea Hunter, a full-scale prototype of an autonomous surface vessel that’s designed to be able to launch from a pier and go out on its own for weeks or months at a time, for thousands of miles at a stretch.

The 132-foot-long, diesel-powered vessel was built by U.S. defense contractor Leidos under DARPA’s ACTUV program, a somewhat clunky nested acronym that stands for Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel.

The ship, now a joint project with the U.S. Office of Naval Research, was originally conceived as a tracker of stealthy diesel-electric submarines, but it’s a flexible platform. “What we’ve kind of realized over the course of the program is that it’s a truck,” program manager Scott Littlefield tells IEEE Spectrum. “It’s got lots of payload capacity for a variety of different missions.”

Unmanned ships are nothing new. They can, for example, be launched far from shore off a larger vessel and controlled remotely by a human operator. But this arrangement places constraints on the size of such a ship, and its range as well, since it can only carry so much fuel.

“You really don’t want that to be a remote-controlled vessel. You want it to be fairly autonomous so that it can do things like obstacle avoidance on its own without being joysticked around by a person.” —Scott Littlefield, DARPA

ACTUV explores what can be done with a stand-alone vessel, one that could launch from a pier. Launching in this way frees up the size and range constraints on the ship. But it also raises the rather undesirable prospect of trying to remotely operate a ship thousands of miles away via satellite. “You really don’t want that to be a remote-controlled vessel,” says Littlefield. “You want it to be fairly autonomous so that it can do things like obstacle avoidance on its own without being joysticked around by a person.”

Building that autonomy, Littlefield says, “was probably the most difficult technical challenge from a DARPA perspective.” To cross the seas the ship must adhere to the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, a set of rules that govern, among other things, when a vessel has the right of way and should stay the course and when it is supposed to “give way,” maneuvering itself to avoid a collision with another ship.

Since the maneuver has to be detectable by the operator of the other vessel, it can’t be too subtle. “Course changes are preferred to speed changes because they’re more observable,” Littlefield explains. So is one big change as opposed to a series of smaller ones: drama over precision, you might say. “To some degree you want to make the maneuvers appear as though they’ve been made by a human operator,” he says. “That’s what other people are going to expect to see.” Dauntingly optimized traffic situations, like this vision of a future intersection where all the cars are autonomous, will have to wait.

Some of ACTUV’s autonomous testing has already been done over the last two years or so using a “surrogate”—a 40-foot work boat based on the U.S. Gulf Coast that has the same software and above-water sensors. That ship, with human monitoring, made an autonomous voyage from Gulfport, Miss., to nearby Biloxi. Although it was a short distance, Littlefield says the waterway is fairly congested and so a good test.

Sea Hunter, which is currently in Portland, Ore., will soon be shipped south to San Diego, Calif. When it arrives in May, Littlefield says, engineers will be ramping up testing of its autonomous functions. The vessel is slated for two years of testing in San Diego, he says. During that time, DARPA will hand the vessel off to the Office of Naval Research.

Sea Hunter uses radar and an automatic ship identification system to keep track of its surroundings. The ACTUV research team is also exploring using cameras to help with visual classification of vessels, since rules vary with vessel type.

Here’s a video of a very clean-looking Sea Hunter during its launch in January and a subsequent speed test.

Follow Rachel Courtland on Twitter at @rcourt

© Copyright 2018 IEEE Spectrum

My favorite comment:
"When Chinese, Iranian or Russian hackers took control of those, or just jam it, and it's SAT, GPS, and NAVLINKs, with cheap Electronic Warfare (EW) buoy, we are screwed.

If we are lucky, they will "only" disable it. If not, they will re-task it to track our boomers and attack subs."
kd ... ke-a-human
BFCus Regularus
Posts: 559
Joined: Fri Feb 24, 2017 12:50 am

Re: Seth Rich

Postby kinderdigi » Tue Jan 09, 2018 8:30 am

Mass GPS Spoofing Attack in Black Sea?

By Dana Goward 07/11/2017 08:27:09

The Maritime Executive

By 07/11/2017 08:27:09

An apparent mass and blatant, GPS spoofing attack involving over 20 vessels in the Black Sea last month has navigation experts and maritime executives scratching their heads.

The event first came to public notice via a relatively innocuous from the U.S. Maritime Administration:

A maritime incident has been reported in the Black Sea in the vicinity of position 44-15.7N, 037-32.9E on June 22, 2017 at 0710 GMT. This incident has not been confirmed. The nature of the incident is reported as GPS interference. Exercise caution when transiting this area.

But the backstory is way more interesting and disturbing. On June 22 a vessel reported to the U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Center:

GPS equipment unable to obtain GPS signal intermittently since nearing coast of Novorossiysk, Russia. Now displays HDOP 0.8 accuracy within 100m, but given location is actually 25 nautical miles off; GPS display…

After confirming that there were no anomalies with GPS signals, space weather or tests on-going, the Coast Guard advised the master that GPS accuracy in his area should be three meters and advised him to check his software updates.

The master replied:

Thank you for your below answer, nevertheless I confirm my GPS equipment is fine.

We run self test few times and all is working good.

I confirm all ships in the area (more than 20 ships) have the same problem.

I personally contacted three of them via VHF, they confirmed the same.

Sometimes, position is correct, sometimes is not.

GPS sometimes looses position or displays inaccurate position (high HDOP).

For few days, GPS gave a position inland (near Gelendyhik aiport) but vessel was actually drifting more than 25 NM from it.

Important: at that time, GPS system considered the position as "Safe within 100m".

See attached.

Then last night, position was correct despite several "lost GPS fixing position" alarm that raised couples seconds only; then signal was back to normal.

Now position is totally wrong again.

See attached pictures that I took on 24 June at 05h45 UTC (30 min ago).

Note: you can also check websites like MarineTraffic and you will probably notice that once in a while all ships in the area are shifting inland next to each other.

I hope this can help.

To back up his report, the master sent photos of his navigation displays, a paper chart showing his actual position and GPS-reported position, and his radar display that showed numerous AIS contacts without corresponding radar returns (below).

One of the photos was of the navigation receiver’s “GPS Information Screen.” This has allowed navigation experts to conclude this was a fairly clear, if not subtle, case of “spoofing” or sending false signals to cause a receiver to provide false information. They point to the receiver saying its antenna is 39 meters underwater, that all the GPS satellites it is using have the same high signal strength, and that the WER, or Word Error Rate, is 97 percent (normal is less than 10 percent).

The RNT Foundation has received numerous anecdotal reports of maritime problems with AIS and GPS in Russian waters, though this is the first publicly available, well-document account, of which we are aware.

Russia has very advanced capabilities to disrupt GPS. Over as a defense against attack by U.S. missiles. And there have been press reports of Russian GPS jamming in both Moscow and the Ukraine. In fact Russia has boasted that its capabilities “,” and the U.S. Director of National Intelligence recently issued a that stated that Russia and others were focusing on improving their capability to jam U.S. satellite systems.

Assuming Russia is behind this, why would they do such a thing?

Maybe it was to encourage use of the Russian GLONASS satellite navigation system or their terrestrial Loran system, called Chayka, instead of GPS.
Perhaps it was for some security reason known only to them.

Whatever the reason, we are reminded of a maritime GPS disruption incident last year and the U.S. Coast Guard’s about GPS and all satnav - “Trust But Verify.”

Dana A. Goward is President of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation.

The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.

© Copyright 2018 The Maritime Executive, LLC. All rights reserved. ... -black-sea
BFCus Regularus
Posts: 559
Joined: Fri Feb 24, 2017 12:50 am

Re: Seth Rich

Postby MJK » Tue Jan 09, 2018 9:54 pm

...if you can't geolocate Seth Rich, you can't question him. Cool article.
User avatar
BFCus Regularus
Posts: 1432
Joined: Thu Mar 25, 2004 2:59 am
Location: Fairbanks

Re: Seth Rich

Postby kinderdigi » Tue Jan 09, 2018 10:41 pm

Drone hijacked by hackers from Texas college with $1,000 spoofer

Lisa Vaas

Naked Security

Researchers at the University of Texas at Austin hacked and hijacked a drone in front of the dismayed Department of Homeland Security officials who had dared them $1,000 to do it.

According to exclusive coverage of the event from Fox News, the researchers flew the small surveillance drone over the Austin stadium last Monday.

The drone followed a series of GPS waypoints programmed into its flight computer in what initially looked like a routine flight.

At one point, the drone veered off course from its intended flight path.

It banked hard to the right, “streaking” toward the south, before it turned to hurtle at the ground in what looked like imminent drone suicide, according to Fox’s description.

A safety pilot radioed the drone – which was owned by the university, according to Reuters – and forced it to pull up just a few feet before it would have crashed into the field.

The demonstration of the near-disaster, led by Professor Todd Humphreys and his team at the UTA’s Radionavigation Laboratory, points to a “gaping hole” in the US’s plan to open US airspace to thousands of drones, Fox noted: namely, drones can be turned into weapons, given the right equipment.

The researchers managed to hack the drone with a spoofer they put together with about $1,000 worth of parts.

The Department of Homeland Security traditionally has been concerned with GPS jammers – the method of interference that some believe Iran used to bring down a US spy drone in December.

But others, including an anonymous Iranian engineer quoted by the Christian Science Monitor, say that Iran actually used the same spoofing technique that the Texas researchers demonstrated.

Spoofing allows a hacker to take control of a GPS-guided drone and force it to do whatever the attacker commands.

According to the Christian Science Monitor, this is how the engineer described the Iranians’ use of spoofing:

The 'spoofing' technique that the Iranians used - which took into account precise landing altitudes, as well as latitudinal and longitudinal data - made the drone 'land on its own where we wanted it to, without having to crack the remote-control signals and communications' from the US control center, says the engineer.

Spoofing involves mimicking the signals of the drone’s global positioning device and eventually taking it over completely by sending stronger signals than the unmanned aerial vehicle’s (UAV’s) legitimate commands.

Humphreys claims that the $1,000 spoofer he and his team rigged up to hack the university’s drone last Monday is the most advanced one ever built.

He also says that the implications of a UAV’s vulnerability to this type of spoofing are serious. Here’s how he described the potential scenario to Fox News:

In 5 or 10 years you have 30,000 drones in the airspace... Each one of these could be a potential missile used against us.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon and drone manufacturers in February pressured Congress to order the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to cook up rules that allow government and commercial use of drones in the US by 2015 – an idea that raises serious privacy concerns, with the prospect of police drones keeping watch on citizens already a reality.

Should we trust the US government to darken the skies above us with surveillance UAVs?

On privacy grounds it seems an obvious “No”, and apparently not on “make sure those things aren’t aimed at our heads” grounds either. From Fox News:

DHS is attempting to identify and mitigate GPS interference through its new 'Patriot Watch' and 'Patriot Shield' programs, but the effort is poorly funded, still in its infancy, and is mostly geared toward finding people using jammers, not spoofers.

The potential consequences of GPS spoofing are nothing short of chilling. Humphreys warns that a terrorist group could match his technology, and in crowded U.S. airspace, cause havoc.

"I'm worried about them crashing into other planes," he told Fox News. "I'm worried about them crashing into buildings. We could get collisions in the air and there could be loss of life, so we want to prevent this and get out in front of the problem."

We’re being protected from these chilling scenarios by “poorly funded” programs that are “still in their infancy”?

I don’t have much faith in Congress standing up to the Pentagon and drone manufacturers, so Mr. Humphreys and your team, thanks for getting in front of the problem.

Let’s hope the DHS joins you, preferably before we’ve got hackable juggernauts flying over us.

© 1997 - 2018 Sophos Ltd. ... 0-spoofer/

Capture effect

In telecommunications, the capture effect, or FM capture effect, is a phenomenon associated with FM reception in which only the stronger of two signals at, or near, the same frequency or channel will be demodulated.

The capture effect is defined as the complete suppression of the weaker signal at the receiver limiter (if it has one) where the weaker signal is not amplified, but attenuated. When both signals are nearly equal in strength, or are fading independently, the receiver may switch from one to the other and exhibit picket fencing.

The capture effect can occur at the signal limiter, or in the demodulation stage, for circuits that do not require a signal limiter.[citation needed] Some types of radio receiver circuits have a stronger capture effect than others. The measurement of how well a receiver can reject a second signal on the same frequency is called the capture ratio for a specific receiver. It is measured as the lowest ratio of the power of two signals that will result in the suppression of the smaller signal.

Amplitude modulation, or AM radio, transmission is not subject to this effect. This is one reason that the aviation industry, and others, have chosen to use AM for communications rather than FM, allowing multiple signals to be broadcast on the same channel. Phenomena similar to the capture effect are described in AM when offset carriers of different strengths are present in the passband of a receiver. For example, the aviation glideslope vertical guidance clearance beam is sometimes described as a "capture effect" system, even though it operates using AM signals.[citation needed]

Amplitude modulation immunity to capture effect[edit]

In FM demodulation the receiver tracks the modulated frequency shift of the desired carrier while discriminating against any other signal since it can only follow the deviation of one signal at a time. In AM, the receiver tracks the signal strength of the AM signal as the basis for demodulation. This allows any other signal to be tracked as just another change in amplitude. So it is possible for an AM receiver to demodulate several carriers at the same time, resulting in an audio mix.

If the signals are close but not exactly on the same frequency, the mix will not only include the audio from both carriers, but depending on the carrier separation an audible tone (a beat signal) may be heard at a frequency equal to the difference in the carrier frequencies involved. For instance, if one carrier is at 1000.000 kHz, and the other is at 1000.150 kHz, then a 150 Hz "beat frequency" tone will result.

This mix can also occur when a second AM carrier is received on a channel that is adjacent to the desired channel if the receiver's ultimate bandwidth is wide enough to include the carriers of both signals. In the US AM broadcast bands this occurs at 10 kHz, which is the US channel spacing for the AM broadcast band. Elsewhere it can occur at 9 kHz, a commonly used channel spacing in many locales.

Modern SDR-based receivers can completely eliminate this by utilizing "brick-wall" filters narrower than the channel spacing that reduce signals outside the passband to inconsequential levels. Where such an overlap within the passband occurs, a high pitched whistle at precisely 9 or 10 kHz can be heard. This is particularly common at night when other carriers from adjacent channels are traveling long distances due to atmospheric bounce.

Because AM assumes short term changes in the amplitude to be information, any electrical impulse will be picked up and demodulated along with the desired carrier. Hence lightning causes crashing noises when picked up by an AM radio near a storm. In contrast, FM suppresses short term changes in amplitude and is therefore much less prone to noise during storms and during reception of electrical noise impulses.

For digital modulation schemes it has been shown that for properly implemented on-off keying/amplitude-shift keying systems, co-channel rejection can be better than for frequency-shift keying systems.
BFCus Regularus
Posts: 559
Joined: Fri Feb 24, 2017 12:50 am

Re: Seth Rich

Postby kinderdigi » Tue Jan 09, 2018 10:57 pm

This may be very technical for some... An understanding of the problems with GPS systems (there are many) can be had by reading around the tech stuff. Lots of problems occur in the north seas due to atmospheric (solar storms) interference. The knowledge to use an accurate watch, a accurate compass and a sextant can save your ass. Many commercial vessels no longer require a radio operator. SatCom is now used. But, it was the shipboard radio operator who fixed the navigation systems (GPS et all) when down. The repair guy is gone now, on most vessels. kd

GPS Interference Testing

Lab, Live, and LightSquared

Peter Boulton, Ron Borsato, Brock Butler, Spirent Communications; Kevin Judge, Judge Software Systems, Inc.

Interference can pose a threat to the reception of GNSS signals in a variety of ways. Even low-level signals have the potential to interfere with GNSS receivers, which require very high sensitivity for acceptable performance due to the extremely low received GPS signal power at the Earth’s surface.

Recently, a new potential interference threat has emerged and has attracted much attention in the United States and elsewhere. In January 2011, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) granted satellite broadband provider LightSquared Subsidiary LLC a waiver to operate a terrestrial-only Long Term Evolution (LTE) network that would use L-band spectrum adjacent to the L1 frequencies occupied by GNSS.

The FCC’s waiver included a condition that the company must prove that its signals cause no interference to GPS. The commission set a June 15, 2011 deadline for LightSquared to submit a final report on the issue.

This very short timescale drove an urgent need for subject matter experts within the GPS community to form a GPS Technical Working Group (TWG). The TWG would appoint dedicated expert teams to conduct a comprehensive test campaign to investigate the potential for interference with all categories of GPS receivers. This was especially challenging because, with the exception of the cellular industry, few standardized industry approaches to GPS receiver performance testing exist, especially with regard to interference.

This article uses this test campaign, the methodology and results of which are now in the public domain, as a framework for discussion because it presents an ideal opportunity to review the methods used to quantify interference effects on GPS receivers, especially since the scope included the use of both live and synthesized laboratory signal environments.

Although this article explores these methods in the context of the LightSquared testing campaign, they are applicable to a much wider range of potential interference sources for GNSS. It is not intended to express an opinion on the part of the authors about the impact of LightSquared signals, nor on whether LightSquared should be allowed to deploy. It does, however, present a selection of the results from the TWG report, which was released on June 30, 2011, to illustrate the various methods employed and in particular to describe the value of laboratory testing.

The Cellular, General Location and Navigation, and High Precision Sub-Teams relied heavily on lab testing and it is the testing by these teams that forms the focus of the majority of this article.

The primary conclusions drawn by this article from this test campaign are:

(1) A number of industry-defined methodologies for testing the effects of GNSS interference have emerged, something lacking in the community up to this point.

(2) The laboratory-based testing methods employed to test GNSS interference clearly differentiate device performance and show how different interference presentations affect a representative population of devices.

(3) Multiple test approaches, including lab and live testing, are often needed to achieve conclusive results.

The authors describe the test approaches that have emerged from the TWG campaign, and provide insight into the different considerations used for selection of testing approach and analysis of the data obtained.

Overview of GPS Interference
Although spread spectrum signals themselves are inherently resistant to a wide range of in-band interference sources, the extremely low received power of a GPS signal increases its vulnerability to unintentional interference, such as spurious and out-of-band emissions. These can emanate from telecommunication and electronic systems that may be operating in adjacent bands or in bands relatively far from GPS bands such as FM/TV transmitter harmonics, AM transmitters, and mobile phone networks. Figure 1 illustrates the neighboring signals to GPS L1 and highlights the new potential interference source from LightSquared.

The LightSquared frequency plan has been presented in the 3GPP LTE Release 10 specifications, referred to as Band 24 in 3GPP TS 36.101 version 10.3.0. The downlink and uplink frequency ranges are 1525 MHz to 1559 MHz and 1626.5 MHz to 1660.5 MHz, respectively, and the band can accommodate both 5- and 10-megahertz RF channel bandwidths.

What has concerned the GNSS community especially is that until now the downlink band has been reserved for non-terrestrial Mobile Satellite Services (MSS) as shown in Figure 2, where spectral power densities in the typical operating environments for GPS are low. Current GPS receivers have not been designed with such a “noisy neighbor” to consider.

The downlink deployment scenarios planned by LightSquared are as follows:

(1) Phase 1: 5-megahertz LTE carriers at 1552.7 MHz and/or 1528.8 MHz 5-megahertz Low Only (F5L) 5-megahertz High Only (F5H) 5-megahertz Low + 5-megahertz High (F5L+F5H)

(2) Phase 2: 10-megahertz LTE carriers at 1550.2 MHz and/or 1531 MHz 10-megahertz Low Only (F10L) 10-megahertz High Only (F10H) 10-megahertz Low + 10-megahertz High (F10L+F10H)

There are three types of interference that could be associated with these signals:

(1) Out-of-band emissions that extend beyond their allocated frequency and leak into the GPS L1 band. LightSquared signals coming from terrestrial towers arrive at the receiver with a power level of up to -10 dBm while the mean GPS levels can be as low as -160 dBm. These extreme differences in power levels at the receiver imply very stringent filtering requirements at the LightSquared base stations.

(2) GPS out-of-band, or blocking, interference can result from an undesired response created by the mixing of an LTE signal with the local oscillator (LO) of a GPS receiver. The resulting undesired signals may be translated to the intermediate frequency (IF) stages as spurious response frequencies. Receiver front-end filtering can improve the blocking characteristics by reducing the level of the blocking signal (See Figure 2.) However, they may limit the effectiveness of certain receivers that have wide-band filters to take advantage of satellite-based GPS augmentation systems or to improve crisp code-chip edge detection.

(3) Intermodulation can desensitize a GPS receiver front end when third order intermodulation products created by non-linearities in the front end of a GPS receiver produce distortion products that land in or near the GPS band. This can be the case for the LightSquared F5L+F5H deployment scenario.

Live versus Lab Testing
The TWG test campaign included both lab and live (or field) testing — techniques that also play important roles in receiver development and verification.

A lab testing approach has the advantages of convenience and repeatability, enabling specific test conditions to be constructed and applied repeatedly to assess development progress, essential to those concerned with verifiable performance metrics. In the case of the TWG campaign, lab testing was used to reveal exactly how performance is affected as a function of LTE power, frequency and bandwidth.

Live testing is able to provide composite performance metrics, but is less capable at showing performance impact as a function of power. Other signals may also be present in the live environment that are not necessarily represented in the lab-testing environment. In contrast, lab testing strives to tightly control the environment to eliminate anything that could influence the repeatability of a test. Thus a complete evaluation of interference effects requires both lab and live testing to be conducted.

For the lab-testing component, the Cellular Sub-Team in the TWG testing looked to the performance metrics in the relevant 3GPP and 3GPP2 industry standard specifications. These standards were chosen because they are widely used and accepted in the industry, not because they focus specifically on GPS interference.

The 3GPP 34.171 and 3GPP2 IS-916 specification have long been accepted, by GSM/UMTS and CDMA operators respectively, as representing the minimum performance criteria that must be met by any device in order to operate in a network. In practice, device manufacturers strive for, and many operators demand, better performance than that dictated in these specifications.

The High Precision and General Navigation Sub-Teams did not have the benefit of industry-accepted standards to draw from in developing their lab testing approaches. As a result, new methodologies were defined and the metrics for, and definitions of, harmful interference were more challenging to identify. A common component of all sub-team lab tests was the introduction of the potential LightSquared LTE signal interferer, which was combined with GPS signals before presentation to the unit under test (UUT).

Lab Testing Overview
One valuable outcome of the TWG test campaign is a documented range of lab testing approaches and considerations for GNSS interference testing. These could form a useful reference point for any future attempts to harmonize interference test requirements across the industry.

Some of the most important considerations are discussed here to help compare and contrast the various approaches:

(1) Conducted versus over-the-air (OTA) RF testing
(2) Simulated versus recording and playback of RF signals
(3) Test results and key performance indicator (KPI) analysis
(4) Augmentation systems
(5) Test automation

Conducted versus OTA RF Testing. RF signals are presented to the UUT in a conducted or OTA manner. Conducted testing uses coaxial cables to feed signals directly to the device via an RF port, bypassing the device’s antennas. OTA testing radiates signals wirelessly to the device from an antenna into a controlled RF environment, which typically consists of an anechoic chamber and specialized equipment to precisely control signal levels, angle of arrival, and signal polarization and to suppress unwanted signal reflections. OTA testing accounts for the contribution of the device’s antenna and form factor but adds complexity and cost to the test setup.

A specific consideration with OTA GNSS Interference testing is that blocking signals frequently need to be radiated at a relatively high level to create an incident signal as high +10 dBm. Anechoic chambers have significant over-the-air transmission losses of the order of 40 to 60 decibels; so, powerful amplifiers and associated components are needed. This is not a problem with low-power GPS signals (typically in the –130 to –160 dBm power range).

When performing identical tests across a wide range of devices, it is desirable, whenever possible, to conduct them on multiple devices simultaneously as this is more efficient and aids comparison of results. For conducted testing this can be achieved using coaxial splitters and addressing any isolation issues. For OTA tests, antennas must be separated adequately and located such as to avoid cross-coupling and to ensure that the received signals are uniformly distributed across the array.

These factors dictate the size of anechoic chamber; the bigger the chamber, the greater the number of UUTs that can be tested simultaneously. For example, the TWG testing used chambers ranging from a single assisted-GPS (A-GPS) device within a 12x12x24-foot anechoic chamber to 57 high-precision GPS devices within a 40x40x100-foot chamber!

Simulated Versus Record and Playback of RF Signals. An essential aspect of lab testing is the generation of RF signals. For GPS blocking interference tests, at least two RF signal types must be generated: the GPS satellite signals and the blocking signal. The GPS signal generation can be accomplished through either simulation or a record and playback method.

A GPS simulator enables all elements of the test to be defined in a test case by the user, and then it synthesizes RF signals that are consistent with those GPS signal definitions, requested vehicle motion, and specified environment. Simulator testing allows receiver performance to be compared with a precise reference “truth,” enabling performance to be accurately quantified. The application of controlled changes, including in this case the LTE signals, enables evaluation of performance under a wider range of scenarios.

Record and playback GPS solutions adopt a fundamentally different approach: signals in a given RF band are digitally sampled and stored digitally for subsequent playback in the lab. A key benefit of this approach is that it enables the full rich, and perhaps chaotic, RF environment within the sampled band to be captured and replayed.

However, record and playback does not allow the test signals to be easily modified, and it provides limited insight into the exact nature of the sampled signal. Simulation and record and playback are generally complementary approaches and hence are often used together in a wide-ranging test plan.

For the TWG tests, the Cellular Sub-Team emulated the LightSquared (Band 24) LTE transmitter signals by generating them using an LTE Network Emulator, generating equal physical-channel power levels over all available resources to maintain a flat power spectral density (PSD) across the RF channel bandwidths. These signals were then captured using a vector signal analyzer for playback on a vector signal generator.

Other sub-teams used mathematical software tools to create a sampled LTE signal for subsequent playback on a vector signal generator. Because most signal generators are not able to generate a signal compliant with LightSquared’s proposed spectral mask, a representative bandpass filter was employed at the output of the vector signal generator.

Test Results and Key Performance Indicator (KPI) Analysis. The relevant performance metrics collected and reviewed by most sub-teams during the TWG lab test campaign were: carrier/noise ratio (C/N0), response time (also known as time to first fix, or TTFF), and position error. Although C/N0 proved to be a good metric for assessing and comparing the impact on GPS receivers as LTE signal power is increased, it is not a metric that an end-user would normally encounter. To understand real-world performance degradation, response time and two-dimensional (2D) position error are often more useful KPIs.

Augmentation Systems. The performance of many GPS devices is dependent on various augmentation systems. For example almost all mobile phones currently deployed in North America, require assistance data (e.g., satellite ephemerides, precise time, code phase, Doppler, and their associated uncertainties) when operating in A-GPS mode. High-precision receivers use commercial and other space-based augmentation services to provide correction data. In addition to GPS signals, lab testing requires these augmentation elements to support the normal operating modes of these devices.

A lab test system for A-GPS, for example, also requires a cellular network emulator to provide the cellular network signals that will transport the assistance data (which improves the GPS signal acquisition time and tracking sensitivity) to the device, whether they are CDMA, GSM, WCDMA, or LTE variety.

Also required is a serving mobile location center (SMLC) or position determination entity (PDE), which is the network entity that sources GPS assistance data. The SMLC or PDE must be tightly coupled to the GPS signal generator so that the simulated assistance data is consistent and accurate.

The cellular network connection also acts as a channel for location-specific messages or measurement data, allowing the location to be determined either in the network or the device itself. These messages and data can be mined for performance metrics by an automated test system.

Test Automation. Automation is often an essential element of lab testing, particularly when the scope and scale of tests is large. A challenge such as the LightSquared TWG testing with its aggressive timelines would be impossible without it. The benefits of automating the testing include:

A-GPS Cellular Device Testing
Testing of A-GPS cellular devices in the lab can make use of conducted or OTA test configurations. Figure 3 and Figure 4 illustrate the conducted and OTA test configurations used for TWG Cellular Sub-Team testing, described in the May 15 status report to the FCC described in the Additional Resources section near the end of this article.

Testing subjects the GPS receiver in a UUT to high-power LTE Band 24 signals by conducted injection or by OTA injection in an anechoic chamber. For the OTA testing, the GPS and LTE interferer signals are presented at the same transmit horn to ensure alignment with existing industry-standard anechoic chamber test methodologies and to maintain an acceptable measurement uncertainty limit.

The interfering signals are emulated using signal generators. Care was taken to ensure consistency with LightSquared’s base station emission mask by using representative transmit filters in the test setup.

In order to assess the level of interference, it is necessary to find the point of failure when a change or degradation in the user experience is deemed harmful, based on analysis of key performance indicators (KPIs). To accomplish this, testing can be performed in accordance with industry technical standards. The standards used during the TWG GPS Cellular Sub-Team testing were:

The test objectives addressed multiple representative use cases:

(1) Testing at the GPS sensitivity limits of the devices, representative of indoor or other highly-obscured settings
(2) Testing at intermediate received GPS levels (with equal signal strength from all space vehicles or SVs) to evaluate performance in indoor, dense urban outdoor, or other environments with significant blockage and reflection of GPS signals
(3) Testing at strong received GPS signal levels corresponding to outdoor usage with relatively open-sky conditions (around -130 dBm)

To fulfill the objectives of the tests, the sub-team identified tests from the industry standards referenced earlier that mapped to these use cases, and which were then executed without interferers (baseline) and with varying interferer signal levels. Other desirable test activities, which were not undertaken due to the exceptionally tight time constraints, included simulation of multipath and the playback of recorded real-world data.

LTE interferers were presented at various levels ranging from 0 dBm to –55 dBm to determine the effect on the GPS receivers. Significant innovation — including use of control software to automate the testing — was required to create efficiencies that allowed testing of the maximum number of devices in the limited time period available.

Fortunately, time spent at an early point in the proceedings on optimizing the use of industry-standard test solutions enabled the sub-team to test all devices for the cases deemed to be high priority.

Initial testing focused on LightSquared’s planned Phase 1 downlink spectrum, as described in the earlier section, “Overview of GPS Interference.” This scenario has the potential to generate the highest power density adjacent to the radionavigation satellite system (RNSS) band in which GPS and other GNSS systems operate and can create third-order intermodulation (IM) products in the GPS receiver at the GPS L1 frequency.

Testing was performed with 5-megahertz LTE carriers separately and together to detect third-order IM products. Later testing focused on a deployment scenario with a single 10-megahertz LTE carrier centered at 1531 MHz.

The following KPIs were used to measure the effects on the UUTs: 2D position error, response time (TTFF), and C/N0, together with other metrics reported by the GPS receiver, such as absolute and relative code phase error and Doppler error, that can ultimately affect network-computed location.

To illustrate how these metrics are meaningful, the GPS Nominal Accuracy test (sections and from the TWG test plan) provides a view of how the LightSquared base station transmission will affect the GPS receiver when the eight SVs’ signals are at the 3GPP/3GPP2 required accuracy level of – 130dBm.
Figure 5 depicts how the LightSquared base station transmission affects the GPS receiver’s ability to pass the GPS accuracy test under strong SV signal strength conditions. shows how the actual GPS location accuracy was affected for those devices that passed the test.
These charts show location error with and without the LightSquared blocking signal is roughly equivalent to the 1-sigma noise, which is small in absolute terms but rather large as a percentage. Further, the delta error is inversely correlated with the nonblocker location error; for a receiver that makes better measurements, the blocker appears to show a greater degradation, both absolute and relative.

Figure 6 shows the performance of the devices using nominal accuracy tests required by the FCC, under the different blocker levels proposed by the phase I and phase II LightSquared plan.

Figure 7 is a representation of the performance when the lower 10-megahertz signal was present for the complete set of standardized tests that largely drive E-911 compliance.

General Location/ Navigation GPS Device Testing
The General Location/Navigation Sub-Team created a test plan for evaluating the effects of LightSquared transmissions on GPS receivers that spanned categories such as Fitness, Wilderness Navigation, Marine, Personal Navigation Devices, Emergency Vehicle, Fleet Management, and Portable Aviation devices. All of these operated in the GPS L1 band.

Tests were radiated in an RF Chamber at two facilities (see Figure 8), each of which was capable of testing one device at a time.

The primary metric used to analyze performance was C/N0 degradation reported by the GPS receiver and recorded on a communications monitor provided by each equipment manufacturer. The objective of the testing was to identify the power level of the simulated LightSquared LTE signal that caused each device to degrade 1dB, 3dB, 6dB, 10dB, and 20dB from the baseline for each test scenario. The baseline was defined as the average C/N0 reported by devices with no LTE blocking signal present.

The test methodology from this group was particularly interesting in that it tested both static and dynamic scenarios, i.e., a mobile UUT compared to one that remains at a single point. Dynamic tests are more realistic but also more complex to implement.

Static tests are very useful for measuring metrics such as C/N0 degradation. Table 1 contains example results from Appendix G.21 that show device susceptibility to a 10-megahertz blocking signal at 1531 MHz for a static scenario.

The dynamic tests performed by this group employed both the simulated GPS and the record and playback GPS approaches previously discussed in the “Lab Testing Overview” section. Details of these scenarios can be found in Appendix G.1 (General Location and Navigation Test Plan) of the TWG Final Report.

The simulated dynamic scenario used six satellites with a rectangular device motion trajectory, very similar to that used in GNSS industry-standard device performance tests2.

These dynamic use cases (both simulated and record/playback) create very realistic GPS conditions, yielding performance metrics that map closely to those seen in the real world. At the same time, the GPS signals can be presented to the UUTs repeatedly, in exactly the same way, allowing performance to be accurately analyzed for many devices, with different power levels of the LightSquared LTE signal.

These dynamic tests collected the following metrics as reported from each device every second (i.e., 1-hertz intervals):

One of the primary presentations of results from the TWG report was an overlay of 2D position performance for devices at baseline versus 1dB, 3dB, 6dB, 10dB, and 20dB C/N0 degradation. Figure 9 shows an example where 2D positioning performance is greatly compromised when exposed to 5-megahertz LTE blocking signals at 1552.7 MHz and 1528.8 MHz, with power levels that result in 20-decibel degradation in C/N0 measurement.

The General Location and Navigation Sub-Team also conducted tests for acquisition sensitivity, TTFF, and the U.S. Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) demodulation. The methods for presenting GPS and LightSquared LTE blocking signals remained the same for these tests, but the test sequence and reported metrics changed. More details can be found in Appendix G.1 and G.2 in the TWG Final Report.

High Precision GPS Lab Testing
High precision receivers are used extensively in the areas such as construction, agriculture, mining, and structural deformation, as well as in timing applications. The requirements for testing the effects of Interference on high-precision GPS receivers and those for timing applications differ somewhat from those for mass-market and general navigation GPS devices in a number of areas.

In general, high-precision and timing receivers have much wider bandwidth front-ends in order to extract the maximum amount of information from the GPS signals. They typically track the wider-bandwidth GPS P(Y)- code signal at both L1 and L2 frequencies and rely heavily on carrier phase measurements rather than simply C/Acode phase.

Many receivers in this category operate in modes other than standalone, employing real-time kinematic (RTK) techniques and augmentation from the likes of WAAS or commercial satellite-based augmentation systems (SBASs). Indeed, the latter operate within the same MSS band as the planned LightSquared deployment and could suffer from interference themselves, whereas WAAS operates at the GPS L1 band center frequency, 1575.42 MHz.

Further complexity is introduced by the fact that RTK employs both base station and rover receivers, creating test cases where both, one, or none are subject to the interference source. As a result, receivers of this type tend to be more prone to interference across and near to the range of L-band frequencies in which they operate.

The number and scope of the test cases required by the high-precision test plan were therefore fairly large and had an estimated total duration of more than 67 hours, not including setup times between tests. Performing these tests sequentially for each receiver sample was not considered practical, given the compressed timeline for completing the test program, even though all the scenarios had been fully automated via custom control scripts.

As a result, the sub-team decided to test all samples simultaneously in a very large anechoic chamber hosted by the Facilities for RCS and Antenna Measurements (FARM) at the U.S. Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) facility in Patuxtent River, Maryland. In common with many of the test working groups, a GPS simulator was used as the GPS signal source, although in this case it offered C/A-code and P(Y)-code signals at GPS L1 and P(Y)-code at L2.

The GPS simulator used in these tests was able to deliver a P(Y)- code signal that is P-code but encrypted with an unclassified public-domain model of the actual encrypting code, enabling these receivers to operate in their normal wideband tracking mode.

Two vector signal generators were employed, not only to represent the LTE base-station signals but also to test for the effect of LTE device transmissions in the proximity of a high precision receiver.

Finally, generators were needed for the augmentation signals. WAAS signals were not used because it was decided that any effects would be similar to GPS.

The chamber employed measures 40x40x100 feet and is equipped with a 3x3 foot transmit window halfway up one of the 40-foot walls for transmission of the GPS and /commercial SBAS signals. The accompanying photo shows the wooden UUT antenna support frame as viewed from the transmit window.

The LTE signals were transmitted from pole-mounted antennas within the chamber adjacent to the transmit window, at the same elevation as the other signal sources. For RTK testing, rover or base-station receivers could also be stimulated outside the chamber by the GPS simulator. A block diagram of the installation is shown in Figure 10.

The field strength at the UUT test site for LTE signals generated through a linearly-polarized horn was calibrated using a network analyzer at five locations across the array to ensure linearity, which was within ±3 decibels. Using the distance and the chosen path loss models, the appropriate effective distance from transmitter to UUT could be established for the particular test case. The two LTE signals were transmitted with orthogonal polarizations to minimize coupling. For GPS signals a baseline C/N0 ratio was extracted from a representative UUT.

During all tests, the UUTs were required to continuously record a wide range of raw performance data for subsequent off-line analysis by the manufacturer. As a minimum this included pseudorange, carrier phase, Doppler and C/N0 ratio, but in some cases was also supplemented by tracking variances, signal quality, and the packet error rate (PER) of the augmentation signals.

As the tests were all conducted with the UUT at a simulated static location of N38o15’, W76o25’, it was also possible to record position accuracy in standalone and RTK or augmented modes, as well as pseudorange, Doppler accuracy, and several other parameters relevant to this class of receiver.

A nominal 24 satellite constellation was employed in the GPS simulator, derived from ICD-GPS-200C. Test cases were designed to stimulate receivers in respect of four generic KPIs, namely “Tracking,” “Reacquisition,” Sensitivity,” and “Acquisition.”

In all cases the tests were repeated for each of the six identified LTE downlink signal deployment scenarios described in the “Overview of GPS Interference” section earlier. Additionally, the transmission of uplink LTE signals from a device was explored as a seventh scenario.

For tracking, the test principle was to ramp the LTE interfering signal from minimum -70 dBm to +10 dBm maximum in one-decibel steps with an interval of 60 seconds followed by a two minute dwell time before ramping back down to the -70dBm level at the same rate.

For reacquisition, the test principle was to determine the reacquisition time of the receivers at various levels of LTE signal strength, starting with the minimum and increasing to the maximum in five-decibel intervals. A baseline was established with the LTE signal switched off. At each LTE level, the GPS signal was switched off for 10 seconds after tracking had been established for at least 60 seconds.

The sensitivity test was similar to that of the reacquisition test, but instead of switching off the GPS signals at each of the LTE levels, they were reduced by 15 decibels from their nominal level at a rate of a one-decibel step each minute before returning to the nominal level.

Finally, for the acquisition test, after 5 minutes of nominal GPS conditions from power-on, receivers were warm started repeatedly (a minimum of four times) over a 15-minute period with the LTE signal off in order to establish baseline data. The test was then repeated at LTE levels from minimum to maximum but with a 10-decibel interval.

Inevitably, with such a short time available to organize such complex test scenarios across a wide range of UUTs, a number of compromises had to be made against the original test plan.

The first of these was augmentation signal fidelity. To be useful, augmentations must contain data consistent with the GPS signals that they augment and suitable data was available from the simulator. However, only dummy packets could be transmitted as these commercial systems use a proprietary format. The receivers would naturally reject these packets, and thus only standalone modes could be tested.

However, by measuring the PER and energy-per-bit (Eb/No) obtained, this technique was valuable in assessing reception of the augmentation signal itself in the face of the LTE signal. Secondly, no attempt was made to compensate for the lower path loss of radiated signals at L2 when compared to L1.

Finally, during device-based interferer testing, the LTE transmission filter used was not fully representative of those likely to be employed in actual devices, yielding results that would probably be slightly worse than if a better filter were used.

In all, 57 high precision receivers were tested in the chamber, of which 13 were timing receivers. The final report used data from 48 of these receivers, including 14 timing units.

Receiver manufacturers were given the task of translating the test conditions into equivalent operational scenarios and then analyzing the associated data gathered from these scenarios to determine the likely operational effects. For this purpose they would apply two propagation models: a simple square-law free-space model and a more complex WILOS (Walfisch Ikegami Line Of Sight) model.

KPIs employed in the analysis encompassed the 10, 50, and 90 percentiles for:

In each case, the tests identified the divergence point from nominal operation, which represents the level at which the interferer began to have an effect

Figure 11 shows a summary of the divergence point KPIs for the chamber tests.

To illustrate how to interpret this table, consider the top left cell. The data indicate that 10 percent of the receivers tested exhibited a drop in L1 C/N0 with the F5H LTE signal at –82dBm. Any zeros in the table indicate that the condition was not observed.

The equivalent data for timing receivers is shown in Figure 12. The divergence points were determined from the curves similar to those shown in Figure 13.

GNSS vulnerability, and the specific procedures and test methodologies that help quantify the impact of other signals, is an important topic in today’s world. More coexistence issues such as those that have arisen from the proposed LightSquared terrestrial LTE network deployment can be expected, and may even be inevitable, given the pressure for ever more spectrum allocation that is driven by an explosion in demand for mobile broadband.

The case for developing a sound and comprehensive test strategy for GNSS interference is simple:

(1) The effects of emerging signals need to be accurately understood as early as possible to avoid controversy late in the process, such as we are seeing today, and
(2) any mitigation techniques that may be required need to be well characterized in controlled environments to understand performance tradeoffs so that the next generation of GNSS equipment is both resilient and economical.

The LightSquared TWG test campaign, designed by industry leaders, has clearly shown the value of lab-based testing in quantifying the effects of interference on GPS and it represents a potential basis for an industry-wide consensus on a standardized approach to GPS performance testing. Differences in performance across devices and interferer presentations have been shown to be clear and repeatable. When combined with results from live testing, the results from lab testing have made tangible conclusions possible and enabled important decisions to be made.

More (much more!) information can be found in the TWG Final Report, and the experts at Spirent and Judge Software Systems would be pleased to help answer questions.

Additional Resources
[1] Borio, D., and L. Lo Presti, D., Odijk, G. Lachapelle, and M. Petovello, “Mathematical Models and GNSS Interference,” GNSS Solutions column, Inside GNSS, March/April, 2008
[2] Federal Communications Commission, Deere submission: LightSquared Interference to GPS and StarFire, May 26, 2011
[3] Federal Communications Commission, LightSquared Technical Working Group status report, Washington, D.C., May 15, 2011
[4] Federal Communications Commission, LightSquared Technical Working Group final report, Washington, D.C., June 30, 2011
[5] Foegelle, M., and R. Borsato, H. Alparslan, and B. Butler, “Over-the-Air Test Method: A-GPS Antenna Performance,” GPS World, September 2009
[6] Petrovski, I., and B. Townsend and T. Ebinuma, “Testing Multi-GNSS Equipment: Systems, Simulators and the Production Pyramid,” Inside GNSS, July/ August 2010
[7] Petrovski, I., and T. Ebinuma, “GNSS Simulators, Part 2: Everything you wanted to know...but were afraid to ask,” Inside GNSS, September 2010
[8] Petrovski, I., and T. Tsujii, J.-M. Perre, B. Townsend, and T. Ebinuma, “GNSS Simulation: A User’s Guide to the Galaxy,” Inside GNSS, October 2010
Peter Boulton

Ron Borsato

Copyright © 2018 Gibbons Media & Research LLC, all rights reserved.
BFCus Regularus
Posts: 559
Joined: Fri Feb 24, 2017 12:50 am

Re: Seth Rich

Postby kinderdigi » Wed Jan 10, 2018 12:28 am

GPS systems in current use... and they can all be hacked:

GPS Satellite Systems Around the World

Live View GPS Tracking Blog

The United States is working on advancing its GPS satellite constellation through the replacement of aging satellites with new, modernized GPS III satellites. But the U.S. isn’t the only country developing and advancing GPS technology. Japan, China, India, Russia, and Europe are developing new technologies similar to the United States Global Position Satellite System.

United States (GPS)

The United States was the first country to introduce satellite technology with the global positioning system (GPS). This satellite navigation system, which is operated by the United States government, offers navigation and tracking technology, including location, time and other data, throughout the planet. Individuals, corporations, and military personnel utilize GPS devices and GPS trackers. In terms of advancements, Lockheed Martin is currently developing a new GPS III series for improved signal power, accuracy, and reliability, which will further help with navigation and more precisely timed services. Boeing is also developing new GPS technology with 12 satellites belonging to the IIF series; these will have higher accuracy and longer life expectancy.

Japan (QZSS)

The Quazi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) is Japan’s satellite system, which is similar to a GPS satellites with some slight variations. The QZSS is a system using three satellites and is expected to be fully functioning in 2013. The satellites in this constellation are expected to orbit Japan and other areas of Asia, which will further increase the accuracy of GPS signals in the US. The signal receiver from the QZSS will function with the GPS satellites as well as its own entity. “We are in an era of the gold rush for satellite launches,” said Ryo Kurokawa of the Core’s advanced embedded technology center in Japan. Kurokawa foresees approximately 140 launched satellites by 2018.

Russia (GLONASS)

Russia also has its own satellite system, called the Russian Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS). The design and development for GLONASS dates back to the 1970s though it was never fully functional. In the last 10 years, new satellites have been introduced into the system and it now has optimal signal coverage. GLONASS is similar to GPS and includes 24 satellites located in 3 orbit places. Each satellite has the same code with a variety of frequencies, unlike GPS systems where there are just two frequencies and a different code for each of its satellites. GPS receiver manufacturers are beginning to use GLONASS technology in order to receive signals from GPS and GLONASS satellites.

China Peoples Republic of China (BeiDou Navigation Satellite System)

In China, there is the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System, which will consist of more than 30 satellites. This satellite system intends to have two levels of signals to be used for military and civilians. Officials in China have reported that the satellite constellation (formerly referred to as Compass) is expected for global availability by 2020.

European Union (Galileo)

Another ambitious satellite system aside from GPS in development is the Galileo system in Europe, and is a Global Navigation Satellite System (GSNN). The development for Galileo began in 2003 and is expected to be fully completed by 2019. Galileo will have 30 satellites (27 active with 3 spares) with signals reaching throughout the globe. Galileo is funded by public and private sectors, as opposed to the public only funding of the US GPS system.

India (IRNSS)

Lastly, there is the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS) in India. This is most scaled down satellite system as opposed to the European, Chinese, Russian, and certainly the United States satellite systems, with seven satellites to cover India’s land and sea. It is expected to be completed and fully functional by 2014.

Technology, in conjunction with GPS and similar satellite systems, is changing the way communication, navigation, and tracking works across the globe. As countries embark on their own version of satellite systems, the accuracy of signals and applications around the world continues to improve and expand.

© 2007-2018 LiveViewGPS Inca ... ems-world/
BFCus Regularus
Posts: 559
Joined: Fri Feb 24, 2017 12:50 am

Re: Seth Rich

Postby kinderdigi » Wed Jan 10, 2018 12:41 am

BFCus Regularus
Posts: 559
Joined: Fri Feb 24, 2017 12:50 am

Re: Seth Rich

Postby kinderdigi » Thu Jan 11, 2018 4:57 am

MJK wrote:...if you can't geolocate Seth Rich, you can't question him. Cool article.

It appears, at this point that, Seth Rich is a mere (not to discredit his life and death) waypoint in this journey.
As the worm turns, big fish will fry. ... e4-1946821

Best, kd
BFCus Regularus
Posts: 559
Joined: Fri Feb 24, 2017 12:50 am

Re: Seth Rich

Postby kinderdigi » Fri Jan 12, 2018 3:55 am

Many thought Aaron Swartz's suicide was odd. Now, this one. Almost exactly five years later?

A tribute to James Dolan, co-creator of SecureDrop, who has tragically passed away at age 36

Trevor Timm
Executive director, Freedom of the Press Foundation

January 9, 2018

It was with an extremely heavy heart that we recently learned our friend and former colleague James Dolan—one of the co-creators of SecureDrop and Freedom of the Press Foundation’s first full time employee—took his own life over the holidays. He was 36.

In 2012, James worked with Aaron Swartz and journalist Kevin Poulsen to build the original prototype of SecureDrop, the open source whistleblower submission system, which was then called DeadDrop. Poulsen described James’s role in the project’s creation in the New Yorker in 2013:

In New York, a computer-security expert named James Dolan persuaded a trio of his industry colleagues to meet with Aaron to review the architecture and, later, the code. We wanted to be reasonably confident that the system wouldn’t be compromised, and that sources would be able to submit documents anonymously—so that even the media outlets receiving the materials wouldn’t be able to tell the government where they came from. James wrote an obsessively detailed step-by-step security guide for organizations implementing the code. “He goes a little overboard,” Aaron said in an e-mail, “but maybe that’s not a bad thing.”

Beyond a couple references on our website, that New Yorker story is virtually all that is in the public domain about James’s involvement in the project—and that’s how he preferred it. James was an intensely private and modest person, and despite the fact the SecureDrop soon got a lot of attention when Freedom of the Press Foundation (FPF) took the project over, he constantly insisted that Aaron deserved all the credit.

Yet SecureDrop would not currently exist without James, and he deserves all the commendation in the world for making it what it is today.

In January 2013, Aaron Swartz himself committed suicide as the US government was attempting to prosecute him for violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act related to allegedly copying academic articles from JSTOR. SecureDrop was an unrelated side project he was working on at the time. A few months after Aaron’s tragic death, Kevin Poulsen donated the SecureDrop project to FPF, in the hopes that we could revive it and get it in a place where more news organizations could use it.

At that point, James was literally the only person in the world who knew all the ins and outs of the system, how to install it, and how to make it better. He had a high-paying computer security job at a large company by then, but I asked him if he’d be willing to come work for us so we could try to get SecureDrop into more newsrooms. We had hardly any money at the time, yet he immediately agreed—even though it meant taking an 80% pay cut. (Later, he would even refuse to accept a raise, insisting that we use any new funding to hire additional people to work on the project instead.)

He was our first full-time employee at Freedom of the Press Foundation, and quickly set out to teach other developers, contributors, and anyone interested in how the system worked. He poured his heart and soul into the work, traveling to newsrooms around North America to teach IT staffs and journalists in person how to install and use SecureDrop. He completely reworked the installation process, he pushed us to get independent security audits of the system, and he helped us hire the initial team that would take over SecureDrop once he was gone.

James’s encyclopedic knowledge of computer and network security was a key reason why newsrooms were comfortable adopting SecureDrop when it was still seen as something relatively new and unknown.

James left FPF in August of 2015 after he felt the project was in a place where it could survive without him. Ever since, he had been working on the security team at Classy, a crowdfunding site for non-profit organizations located in San Diego.

We don’t know why James took his own life; we do know, however, he long suffered from PTSD from his time serving in the Marines during the Iraq War. It was an experience that affected him in multiple ways. He often cited the Iraq War as his inspiration for wanting to help journalists and whistleblowers; it made him realize governments needed to be much more transparent and accountable.

Memorial services have not yet been finalized, but if you knew James personally, please feel free to reach out to us through our contact form, and we are happy to keep you informed of anything we learn.

Finally, if you suffer from depression or PTSD and are considering harming yourself, please reach out to Suicide Prevention Lifeline. Some of our best and brightest minds have suffered in silence, and sometimes keep loved ones in the dark. Please know that you are not alone.

It is impossible to overstate how fundamentally important James Dolan was to the development of both Freedom of the Press Foundation and SecureDrop. We are heartbroken he is gone, but we are also eternally grateful to have known and worked with him. ... ay-age-36/

SecureDrop is an open-source whistleblower submission system that media organizations can use to securely accept documents from and communicate with anonymous sources. It was originally created by the late Aaron Swartz and is currently managed by Freedom of the Press Foundation.
BFCus Regularus
Posts: 559
Joined: Fri Feb 24, 2017 12:50 am

Re: Seth Rich

Postby kinderdigi » Fri Jan 12, 2018 1:56 pm

Webb 'Suicide' Looking More Like Murder

'Move-On - Nothing To See Here' How convincing is this statement: Coroner Robert Lyons said his office had been swamped with calls. "It's unusual in a suicide case to have two shots," he said, "but it has been done in the past, and it is in fact a distinct possibility." This milquetoast declaration sounds like the pathetic utterance of someone who's trying to cover his career ass, all the while crossing his fingers behind his back. Maybe - just maybe, it's also indicative of someone who wants to keep his own life intact. I'd say it's a distinct possibility! While the coroner spews his Webb suicide fallacy to the numbed down and distracted (pre-holiday) masses - he simultaneously implores any doubters of the official mythology to immediately discard their tin-foil hats along with their conspiracy theories and just move on cause there's nothing to see here. Nope, there's nothing to SEE or KNOW here. Mr. Lyons pronouncement about a distinct possibility of suicide, not even PROBABILITY, should be enough of a RED FLAG to convince even the true believers that something is rotten in Sacramento. If Gary Webb committed suicide with 2 shots to the head via a .38 caliber pistol, then I've got a nice condo to sell you in Fallujah! But wait, there's more compelling evidence to refute the lie that what we have here is a suicide. And it looks a lot like cotton candy all spin and mostly hot air evidence. Once you bite into it you realize it's a bundle of perception control, mostly innuendo, or black magic designed to conjure a pre-determined picture in your mind, in order to reinforce the BIG lie. Then there's the issue of 2 shots to the head with a .38 caliber pistol. Shouldn't that fact alone trigger an investigation into a POSSIBLE homicide and an independent autopsy? And I haven't even mentioned the inconsistent reporting about Gary's wounds/wound and purported weapon he allegedly used to kill himself. A quick reiteration of the official obituary waffle is as follows: reported first, a suicide with multiple wounds to the head, then a suicide with a wound to the head, then there's a speculated shotgun wound to the face, by Mike Ruppert, because of a verbal report, given to Ruppert from the coroner's office implying that Webb's face was beyond recognition ... webb.shtml, and finally 2 wounds to the head with a .38 caliber revolver. Incidentally his gun was kept in the nightstand next to his bed. It was his Dad's gun. Nice touch of detail here. But what does it tell us? Maybe, Gary was concerned, because he had been the recipient of death threats? Maybe that's the REAL reason he had a gun in a drawer next to his bed. According to an informative and revealing article /audio segment, on Alex Jone's Prison Planet website, Gary did indeed have something to be very worried about: Ricky Ross, one of Gary Webb's primary sources had spoken to Gary in the days before his death. Gary told Ricky that he had seen men scaling down the pipes outside his home and that they were obviously not burglars but 'government people'. Gary also told Ricky that he had been receiving death threats and was being regularly followed. It was also mentioned that Gary was working on a new story concerning the CIA and drug trafficking. ... rdered.htm Moreover, why was there so much confusion about the method and number of wounds? Was it that difficult to sort out? Or was something else going-on? I really liked the potshot in the final obituary about the feverish conspiracy theorists on the internet who had been calling the coroner's office, demanding to know the number of wounds Webb ACTUALLY sustained. Now trying to determine factual details based on confused reports makes you a conspiracy theorist. Move on folks, nothing to see here! Don't you find it odd that there's no mention of the FACT that Gary had powerful enemies in HIGH places. But we are told that Gary was a failed investigative journalist who let the public down, by inflating and inventing facts, while jumping to unsubstantiated conclusions. We read over and over again that he was rightfully demoted, had no credibility in mainstream circles, and couldn't get a job at a major newspaper to save his sorry life because he was damaged goods. This is the mantra of the mainstream media repeated ad-nausea. The character assassination is a nice complement to the actual assassinationÖdon't you think? The primary reason we are to believe Gary Webb committed suicide is, because he is characterized as having been distraught. As a former psychotherapist, I can assure you DISTRAUGHT doesn't = SUICIDAL! And I might add unequivocally, THAT CLINICALLY DEPRESSED/SUICIDAL PEOPLE ARE VERY UNLIKELY TO MAKE FUTURE PLANS THAT INCLUDE selling their homes and making MAJOR MOVES while in a depressed/suicidal state. Let's examine a sampling of the laundry list of reasons, given by the powers that be, to persuade us that Gary Webb's death was a shut and closed case of suicide. Move on, nothing to investigate here. But we certainly need to get the latest scoop on Michael Jackson or Jon Bennet, don't we? 1. It was stated that he was distraught because he couldn't get a job at a major newspaper. And he probably was distraught-- but does that make him suicidal? Besides, his career as a mainstream investigative journalist, working for a prestigious newspaper, was over a long time ago. According to the American Heritage Dictionary, the word distraught means: agitated with anxiety; worried. 2. Crazed or MAD. The root of the word is from ME (Middle English) and it means to distract. Moreover, Gary was employed with a weekly newspaper: Sacramento News & Review, which gave him an opportunity to ply his craft, albeit not at the level he would have liked or that he deserved. In spite of this, his ex-wife Susan Bell is quoted in one of the obituaries as saying (about Gary): "All he ever wanted to do was write." Gary was doing what he loved best: writing, and getting paid for it. The fact that he had been basically blacklisted as a journalist for some time was something that Mr. Webb had learned to live with, and had successfully integrated into his life. I base that observation on the fact the he continued his investigative writing career, despite the earlier losses to his reputation and his earning capacity. 2. His motorcycle was recently stolen. This is so absurd it deserves no comment. 3. His mortgage payments were too high. Many Americans are living with mortgage payments that are too high, especially when these same people are unemployed. And clinically depressed people would likely allow a foreclosure situation, before facing the problem head-on and making a firm decision to move and following up by selling their house. Apparently Gary was able to sell his house, pack his belongings, determine a moving date, hire a moving company, and continue writing and working. I assume Gary had also signed a lease, bought a house, or had other suitable living conditions set-up ahead of time-- wherever he was moving to. Of course, nothing is mentioned about his NEW home. That wouldn't fit with the spin we're being given about the distraught Gary Webb. This doesn't sound like a clinically depressed person to me. 4. He PLACED (evocative and misleading word) his baby shoes in his mothers shed. To me 'placed' sounds very deliberate and hints at twisted act suggestive of death. Read the sentence again and substitute the word 'put' for 'placed'. Ah, a completely different picture. Assuming he actually did put his baby shoes in his mother's shed, we can only project what it MIGHT really mean--and I think that's the point. He was moving, do you think just maybe he decided his BABY shoes should be stored at his mother's house. After all, baby shoes are a common memorabilia for mothers. Or is it possible he RETURNED his baby shoes to his mother. A shed is a place for storing things one isn't currently using! I think this reference to baby shoes is non- sequitur logically but creates the INTENDED picture. 5. He made his ex wife Susan Bell a beneficiary of his bank account--months ago. How many months ago? Does this mean Gary is going to kill himself? It doesn't sound to me like he had that much $ in his bank account, after all he's moving because his mortgage payments are too high. It seems just as likely that he might do this as a precaution, in case he got sick, or was unable to take care of his financial matters, so his ex wife could help him. 6. Mr. Webb mailed NOTES (do we mean letters) to his family members. Well... he was moving and sending notes to his family sounds unremarkable to me. Since when are NOTES considered pathological. What's wrong with this picture? It is never told what kind of NOTES. And yes that's a KEY point. Without additional information there is no point to be made about the NOTES - except notes are commonly associated with suicides. Maybe that's the REAL point. 7. Gary's ex-wife Susan Bell states: "The way he was acting it would be hard for me to believe it was anything but suicide." An interesting OPINION, but she supplies no convincing evidence to illustrate what she means by this. If it's based on baby shoes in sheds, notes to family members, or distraught over career prospects, then I'd say Susan Bell is entitled to her opinion. And no where are we told how long Ms. Bell has been divorced from Mr., Webb or if she has remarried. It's difficult to determine just how close and involved in Gary's life Ms. Bell has been, as of late. However, being Webb's ex-wife still gives Ms. Bell's opinions a lot of weight. In fact, I think she's being unknowingly, and unfairly used as a counterweight to any theories or suspicions by others, that Gary may have been murdered. Then factor in the fact that she is grieving. 8. Then there's that literal smoking gun. We're to believe that Gary shot himself in the head TWICE with a .38? Call some gun shop owners, talk to coroners, and medical personal about the likelihood of that scenario. Even coroner Robert Lyons admits it's only a distinct possibility. I'd say that suicide is a slim to none possibility...just based on the fact that there were 2 shots to the head. It's more like a CONFIRMED COVER-UP. Yet, based on this selective pastiche of flimsy, circumstantial evidence, projections and mere possibilities, we're told it's a confirmed suicide, and to move on nothing, to see here. Mr. Webb made cremation arrangements earlier in the year. Does this prove that Mr. Webb was suicidal, because he made arrangements for cremation earlier in the year? Isn't this something American's do on a regular basis... plan for their eventual death via funeral arrangements. Are all people who have made funeral arrangements suicidal, or are they merely realistic planners? Taking care of one's funeral arrangements is considered a hallmark of responsibility aimed among primarily to help minimize the emotional and financial burden of a grieving family. Oddly enough, Gary wound up adding to his family's grief -- if he indeed committed suicide. It's well known in Hospice programs, and widely available via literature on grief and loss that suicide is one of the hardest losses to grieve and resolve satisfactorily. Here's a quote From the San Jose Mercury News illustrating a side of Webb that's revealing: "Mr. Webb's friends and colleagues described him as a devoted father and a funny, dogged reporter who was passionate about investigative journalism." 9. We're told Gary was so concerned about the movers who would inevitably find his bloody corpse; he thoughtfully left them a note on the outside door warning them not to enter. "A Better Moving Company" is the name of the moving Company that came to Webb's house that fateful morning and found that odd note posted on his door: "Please do not enter... call 911 and ask for an ambulance." Why an ambulance if he planned to KILL himself? And how strange that he didn't call the movers earlier in the evening or later in the day to cancel said move (due to illness, for example) via the phone. Why the dramatic note? Well, have you ever thought of the POSSIBILITY that if the moving company were involved in 'offing' Gary the perfect way to avoid scrutiny or being investigated would be for said moving company to find the note on the door---- instead of finding the body in the house on the floor. As we all know from the movies when someone finds a dead body they become entangled in the investigation. In this case, that would be avoided because of the NOTE. We also have to ask WHY was Gary that concerned about the movers and the post-traumatic stress that they might have been subjected to? The note to the movers is bizarre to say the least! But there's more. What a coincidence that this moving company has a nefarious operating profile (based on the above link) that is reminiscent, in some ways, of the notorious Israeli connected companies that have recently been coming under legal scrutiny. My point isn't that the any Israelis were involved, but that moving companies can easily be used as fronts for intelligence operations. How easy would it have been for a moving company (person/s) to case Webb's home under the guise of a price quote, and or packing his belongings pre-move, in order to set him-up to be whacked? The hit guy(s) could have been waiting for him when he returned home from his relatively NEW reporter's job -- at the Sacramento News and Review. Do you think it's possible someone who didn't have Gary's best interest at heart could have recommended this shady moving company. How easy would it have been for someone connected with the moving company to make sure an obscure window was unlocked... for example? Of course, this is just speculation. If I were an investigator, I'd definitely find out all the details about the moving company, and how Mr. Webb found this particular moving company. Who was scheduled to move him and who had been to his house? Finally, I'd want to know if Gary had a girlfriend and if they were planning on living together in his new home. At least let's find out if Gary was dating anyone on a steady basis and get her assessment of the situation. After all, he was a very attractive man. 10. There's this quote from the San Jose Mercury News from a former colleague of Gary's: "I'm still in a state of shock," said Tom Dresslar, who works as a spokesman for California Attorney General Bill Lockyer and had known Mr. Webb for 15 years. "He was a hard-core, no-fear investigative reporter," Dresslar said. "He wasn't afraid to stand up to whatever authority." There you have it Gary Webb a fearless reporter, for the PEOPLE, who against all odds would stand up to authority, to the ELITES in order to serve a greater master the TRUTH! We demand an independent autopsy and homicidal investigation into the "DISTINCT POSSIBILITY" that Gary Webb was MURDERED. The way I see it we have at least 4 smoking guns: 1. Two shots to the head 2. Gary had received alleged death threats and had complained of recent break-ins by government agents 3. Allegedly Gary was involved in working on a new story about the CIA and drug trafficking. 4. Gary threatened to systemically expose the drug war for the Trojan Horse that it is, thereby provoking the wrath of the Elites and the CIA. He would not be intimidated. He kept on doing what he did so well, and what he loved so much: investigative journalism. We owe it to ourselves, to Gary Webb, and to all truth seekers, to get behind Alex Jones and his courageous DEMAND for a full and independent investigation of Webb's suspicious death, including an autopsy of his body, before his ashes wind up in an urn on a fireplace mantle in Langley, Virginia.
BFCus Regularus
Posts: 559
Joined: Fri Feb 24, 2017 12:50 am

Re: Seth Rich

Postby kinderdigi » Fri Jan 12, 2018 2:48 pm

Double tap

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This article is about a shooting technique. For other uses, see Double tap (disambiguation).

A double tap is a shooting technique where two shots are fired in rapid succession at the same target with the same sight picture (different from the controlled pair, where a second sight picture is acquired for the second shot).[1][2][3] Instruction and practice of the double-tap improves overall accuracy as shooters often do not have the gun fully extended on the first shot meaning the second of a double-tap is usually the better.[4] The term hammer is sometimes used to describe a double tap in which the firearm's sights are not reacquired by the shooter between shots.[2][3]

BFCus Regularus
Posts: 559
Joined: Fri Feb 24, 2017 12:50 am

Re: Seth Rich

Postby kinderdigi » Thu Feb 08, 2018 5:04 am

kinderdigi wrote:
MJK wrote:...if you can't geolocate Seth Rich, you can't question him. Cool article.

It appears, at this point that, Seth Rich is a mere (not to discredit his life and death) waypoint in this journey.
As the worm turns, big fish will fry. ... e4-1946821

Best, kd

A rolling head gathers no moss..

Madame Defarge
BFCus Regularus
Posts: 559
Joined: Fri Feb 24, 2017 12:50 am

Re: Seth Rich

Postby kinderdigi » Thu Feb 08, 2018 7:05 am

BFCus Regularus
Posts: 559
Joined: Fri Feb 24, 2017 12:50 am


Return to Tin-Foil Hat Cafe

Who is online

Users browsing this forum: No registered users and 1 guest