The private security firms in Central Africa

[Farmdog]

Jefe,

I got selected for the Advanced Civil Schooling program so I am an active duty college student (full pay and benefits with all tuiton paid, 3 to 1 ADSO). I made it a whole semester before I reverted to getting up at 0500 to go to the gym. I am trying to scratch together some high end equipment to do analysis of the spectral signature of elephants. I need to catch up to you some day and buy you a beer so see can scare the local population by discussing COIN in the fullness that is the three block war. Most folks who dress like cinder blocks, waves, sand dunes, or gay blue tigers have no concept of COIN beyond the security LLO. Just curious how you feel about DOS / USAID and the rest of the J9 kids in the big picture.

[MA Lagrange]

Glad to see you have been scuffed up and not fled the scene of the crime. I actually have some questions for you about African policy. I am working on a thesis that examines the use of remote sensing data to restart the Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) process in southern African nations (focusing initially on conservation then shifting to devolution of power and economic development). Do you have any experince with CBNRM in Africa? If so what is your opinion of the policy approach from your experience. Good luck, stay safe, and say hello to Pumba for me.

Hello,

Well… Life is funnier when it rains lead. ;-)

About CBNRM, I do not have experience in tat areas as such. Most of my experience in natural resources management is firewood related. Had an experience in Chad with refugee camp and natural resources management in desert environment and also some experience in firewood use reduction in forest environment. But I cannot say I’m qualified in that field. I would need more details on the problematic and policies you’re working on to be in position to help you.

COIN does not target one area or another excepting the different operations/objectives based on what phase its in. Its "holistic" (now doesn't that sound trendy).

As a rule of thump: know your context and who you work with, endogenous and exogenous:

For a long time the DFID (Brits) was very keen on local leadership empowerment but found out eventually that you need to have a deep knowledge of individuals involvement into the previous regime and war if you want that to work out. In Sierra Leone lots of efforts were made to build transitional justice through empowering local chief, It eventually failed because during the conflict, traditional chief did get involved by acting as parties of the conflict and fuelled ethnic tensions.

In South Sudan, neighbouring countries as Uganda pushed a lot for local leader empowerment, arguing that it was they were the roots of legitimacy at local level. From my experience there, does not work so much to strength police capacities and community policing. Part from the fact that South Sudan police is made of former incompetent SPLA, Uganda pushed it to undermine GoSS capacity to build formal police forces and impose formalisation of justice through written law.

In both cases, what made the state building efforts to fail was the absence of knowledge of involved actors. In Sierra Leone, most chiefs were full party to the conflict and aggravated the conflict by setting policies against other ethnic groups.
In Sudan, Uganda, an SPLA ally, was also making sure that a strong neighbour would never rise.

"Holistic"

On the 3 military phases, I think one of the key to the problematic has been identifying the path between hold and build. IMO, those phases are mixed rather than sequential.

And your COIN effort has to start from the very beginning of hold and not as a response to failed hold phase. Cause in that case you’re in a “take back” phase.

By the way, I love the word “holistic” but never managed to understand what it means once you’re on the field. Some how, but I have told I’m wrong very often, the field demonstrated me that you need some sequence in your institution/State building efforts like building basement before trying to put a roof.

[Atrax]

Thanks Atax. Will look it over. You were/are AD?

Whats up Farmdog? Are you still in?

Former AD, now a bored college kid.

[Jefe]

Well good on both of you. Atrax, I understand the boredom issue. Went from AD to college and did great but something in civvie life was missing to the point of just looking at zombies all day. Ever read that poem sheepdogs? If you are one, its pretty hard to join the herd and put blinders on.

Am working on something along the lines of this discussion. Will get with you two offline if interested when I make some good progress.

Fun part: There is a practical application involved!

Stay in touch guys and Atrax, thanks again. Glad to see its not the boneheads with rifles that see the writing on the wall.

PS: FarmDog, if you ever need help with MMship tng, I really like it and have some good stuff for AD guys.

[Jefe]

High opinion of Civil Affairs, don't care for DOS or many at the Embassy's. Of course its always about who is in the slot at any given time.

Again, I just feel there should be separate forces, Task Organized for the varying missions, which clarifies objectives, synchronization, economy of force et. seq. NGOs mostly sucked ass from what I saw. Incompetnece immune from criticism as they are protected by huggy feely crowds. Selfish and way overpaid. Some were good, most were a disgrace and a con. Penta-esqu philosophies dont work well in reality period, but let alone in a conflict zone.

I feel that most staffs are poorly organized now. Warfighters should maybe have an advance party J9 who stays behind on the rollover. Commo should be part of the 2 shop without question and the 2 shop needs to be plused up in a big way: HUMINT down at the BN level, Company COIST Teams, Interrogators, LEP rep (CID really needs to become something more in tune with OSI and NCIS; they are really bleak and ineffectual).

If you are doing any thesis papers (you too Atrax) we should collaborate and get them on AKO.

PS: My old Country Briefing for Astan is still on AKO and PM me for some great links and a POC I can hook you up. I have to get my AKO squared away post retardedment.

[Atrax]

If you are doing any thesis papers (you too Atrax) we should collaborate and get them on AKO.

Sounds good.

[MA Lagrange]

If you are doing any thesis papers (you too Atrax) we should collaborate and get them on AKO.

May I join? Cause sounds interresting.

[MA Lagrange]

From an electronic friend about the contribution of social science to COIN and more generally the military operations:
The Human Terrain System: Clashing Moralities or Rhetorical Dead Horses?
By Marc W.D. Tyrrell on February 5, 2012

What do we actually know about the operations and effectiveness of the Human Terrain System that would allow for an evaluation of it? In December, 2008, I called for a program evaluation of the HTS along three main lines[5]:

1.First, there should be an evaluation of the truth-claims made by the program within the military context. Is it actually reducing kinetic operations? Is it increasing the effectiveness of COIN[6] operations? Is it materially hampering the operations of the “enemy”? Is it measurably changing the attitudes of military commanders and troops in terms of the TTP’s[7] they employ?
2.Second, there should be an evaluation of the efficiency of the program in bureaucratic terms. In comparison with other programs of a similar size and age, is it managed “efficiently”? Are its HR policies and practices in keeping with “industry standards” [of other bureaucratic programs]? Are its technical assets (e.g. the reachback centre, the MapHT program, etc.) on developmental par with other, similar programs? Are its accounting procedures on par with similar programs? Etc., etc., etc.[8]
3.The third set of evaluations should be “ethical”. Some people inside the Anthropology crowd do not appear to realize that the US Department of Defense has some of the most stringent ethics guidelines for research conducted on human subjects. Consider, by way of example, Title 32, CFR, Part 219 – Protection of Human Subjects from the Office of the Secretary of defence.[9] This established a minimum baseline for research actions taken by DoD employees, and it should be compared and contrasted with the AAA Code of Ethics[10] to establish points of overlap, agreement, disagreement and differing extensions (i.e. areas where there is no overlap). The actions of HTTs should then be compared against this composite ethical “baseline”.[11]

http://www.e-ir.info/2012/02/05/the-hum ... ad-horses/

[Jefe]

Hi MA.

In a hurry, but apologies for the no reply. I hadnt noticed your comment and will get back to you re the previous post

[Jefe]

I gotta be honest with you. I think thats a load of crap and the type of overthinking simple stuff and creating enormous bureaucracies that ensure failure. DIstastrous, expensive, second guessing, master degree bearing, pogues teaming up with the top heavy rear echelon brass. People make good paying careers off of this type of stuff and they ensure mission failure.

Any good leader/unit has a grasp on this and a premise of my paper with be to keep the thousands of civilian NGOs out of it in the same manner that like amounts of different contractors should be eliminated (and theres been alot of progress in that respect).

Heres a couple of examples of measuring success in COIN:

- The neighborhoods you work look out for the few white faces and the security forces/aid guys you run and won't let the bad guys hassle you, to the point of calling up their own militias to help you.

- You are surrounded and outgunned for 3 days with no hope. Your locals refuse to leave you. More start to organize to come relieve you. The local militias attack the insurgents becasue they respect you and your force.

- Repeat like scenarios. Security gets better, economy improves, locals start taking charge and you are sitting back watching more than anything.

By the way, I never had air support, medevac etc. I had nothing, not even body armor on these jobs.

Sorry, it doesn't take a bunch of flow chart and I know thats a blow to an awful lot of folks.

It takes:

LEADERS! The most effective weapons system.

[nowonmai]

We are not worthy.

and I fucking mean that.

[MA Lagrange]

Jefe,

Some quick thoughts:
One of the things you seem to forget is that you do not (and will never) have access control. The people who evolve in the area under your control are present with or without you, even on a battle field. One of the problematic of your COIN effort is that you even are an insecurity aggregator and trigger (just by being there). Therefore you have look at how you reach/build an environment as in the examples you give.

Social sciences, applied to COIN, are not that complex. It becomes complex and stupid when social sciences are there to find a solution or file a gap. What social science may help you with is to understand the social breaks to your pacification efforts you encounter.
But basic remains:
1) Security
2) Basic survival services
3) Job
4) Social services
One of the great components of US pacification failure in Iraq in the beginning was to dismantle Iraqi army and police but being incapable to provide security and ensure access to basic suvival services to population.

Remember that for civilians war is divided as follow:
- Survive (Take)
- Rebuilt (Hold)
- Normality (Build)
Your COIN effort then starts during the hold phase during which you are busy establishing your grip on an area.

[Jefe]

Hey, glad you took no offense and are talking. Read what I posted earlier and I think you will see I already mentioned that stuff.

I agree wholeheartedly that social science is part of the solution and started some of the cultural training for a pretty good sized number of soldiers several years before it was doctrine outside of SF. I already mentioned as much when I mentioned the mandatory for every junior sergeant in my day of Mazlows Hierarchy. They just kept it simple and didn't call it that.

I also mentioned assessing areas by what level of insurgency they are in (IPB) going by the older model of 3 phases rather than 7 which is too complex and measuring progress by seeing it move up or down.

The Army has units geared towards this, but needs a structural reorganization and mission change in my opinion for the National Guard to assume duty for these types of missions that relate to civil affairs and national building type stuff.

Take care and I might be headed your way later this year. Will let you know if I do.

[MA Lagrange]

They go by 7 steps now... Oh boy... One for each days of the week?

You most welcome if you pass by.

[Dr. V]

Social sciences, applied to COIN, are not that complex. It becomes complex and stupid when social sciences are there to find a solution or file a gap. What social science may help you with is to understand the social breaks to your pacification efforts you encounter.

I agree wholeheartedly that social science is part of the solution

Social science is an discipline or a field of studies, it is not something you can 'apply'. You can apply theories from the field of social sciences but as its such a large field this is a pretty wide and meaningless statement until you refer to paradigms, theorists and / or particular subjects within the social sciences.